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Abstract 
 
Prior studies examine the influence of institutional ownership and managerial ownership on earnings 
management with conflicting results. This research investigates the inconsistent results with a developed 
framework through the interaction effect of institutional ownership and firm size on the relationship between 
managerial ownership and earnings management.  The study carries out a test using a sample of 115 
manufacturing companies listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2012. The least square regression 
analysis serves as statistical analysis tool of the study. The study shows that managerial ownership affects 
earnings management practices. Institutional ownership and firm size moderate the relationship between 
managerial ownership and earnings management. The presence of institutional ownership possesses the 
likelihood of a reduction in the practice of earnings management. 
 
Keywords: Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, Firm Size, Earnings Management, Listed 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Various factors have the potentials to affect earnings management practices. Previous studies examine the 
influence of institutional ownership and managerial ownership on earnings management.  In fact, the research 
studies have not found a consistent result of the effect of institutional ownership and managerial ownership on 
earnings management.  Some studies indicate that corporate governance that includes institutional ownership, 
and earnings management has an impact on corporate accounting behaviour (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 
1996; Dempsey, Hunt, and Schroeder 1993; Jiambalvo, 1996; Sandra, 2012).  Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt 
(2002) find that institutional investors, that is, sophisticated investors, are more capable of detecting earnings 
management than non-institutional investors because they have more access to timely and relevant information.  
In contrast, another study by Siregar and Sidharta (2008) finds contradictory evidence about the impact of 
institutional ownership on earnings management that institutional ownership has no bearing on earnings 
management. Moradi (2011) concludes that no significant relationship between institutional ownership and 
earnings quality. In essence, institutional ownership has no impact on earnings management.  Claessens and Fan 
(2002), Porter (1992) also found that institutional investors do not play an active role in monitoring management 
activities.  According to (Bushee, 1998; Porter, 1992) institutional owners are overly focused on short-term 
financial results, and as such, they are unable to monitor management.   
 Proceedings of the International Conference on Accounting Studies (ICAS) 2016 
15-18 August 2016, Langkawi, Kedah, Malaysia 
305 
Kazemian and Zuraidah (2015) investigate the role of firm size in the relationship between managerial 
ownership and earnings management practices. Specifically, their study addresses the question of whether the 
relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management is different according to firm size.  Their 
findings suggest that the firm size as a ‘quasi’ moderating variable, which posits the negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and earnings management.  Study of Taheri, Asadollahi, and Niazian (2014) 
investigate the moderating role of institutional ownership, but on the relationship between free cash flow and 
asset utilization.  The gap arising from the challenges of inconsistency in findings symbolizes the significance of 
the current study. 
 
The objective of this study is to investigate the moderating role of firm size and institutional ownership on the 
relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management practices in the developing countries. 
Based on the problem statement, the study specific objectives are:  
a)   To examine the relationship between managerial ownership and its cause on earnings management in the 
manufacturing companies listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2012. 
b)   To investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and firm size and their causes on earnings 
management in the manufacturing companies listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2012. 
c)    To investigate the interaction effect of institutional ownership and firm size on the relationship between 
management ownership and earnings management in the manufacturing companies listed on Indonesian 
Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2012. 
 
The significance of the study is to emphasise the relevance of institutional ownership and firm size as possible 
explanations of interaction in strengthening and weakening the effect of managerial ownership on earnings 
management especially in developing country listed manufacturing companies. 
  
2. LITERATUR REVIEW, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1   Conceptual Research Framework of the Study 
 
The conceptual research framework of the study is an offshoot of the Ratnawati and Ali (2015), Siregar and 
Utama (2008), and Mansor, Ahmad Zaluki, and Osman (2013) is demonstrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework for the Study 
Source: Adapted from Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988); Siregar and Utama (2008);  
Mansor, Ahmad Zaluki, and Osman, (2013); and Ratnawati and Ali (2015). 
 
2.2 Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, and Earnings Management.  
 
Based on an understanding of agency theory, institutional investors have the opportunity, resources, and ability 
to monitor managers.  It indicates that institutional ownership is associated with a better monitoring of 
management activities, and thus reduces the manager’s ability to manipulate earnings opportunistically. The 
efficient monitoring hypothesis suggests an inverse relationship between a firm’s earnings management activity 
and its institutional share ownership. Several studies also document that institutional ownership inhibits 
managers to engage opportunistically in earnings management (Bange and De Bondt, 1998; Bushee, 1998; 
Chung, Firth, and Kim, 2002; Cornett et al., 2008; Ebrahim, 2007; Koh, 2003; Kazemian and Zuraidah, p 620).  
The phenomenon reduces the willingness of managers to own shares in the company because the freedom to do 
things to satisfy their private benefit is limited by surveillance carried out by institutions that have ownership.  
Thus it can be said that the larger institutional ownership in the company, hence diminishing the desire of 
managers to participate in the own interest of the company. High institutional ownership leads to decreased 
managerial ownership so that earnings management practices can be curtailed. 
 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Firm Size 
Managerial 
Ownership 
Earnings 
Management 
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Chung et al. (2002) also find that the institutional shareholdings inhibit managers from managing accruals to 
achieve the desired level of earnings.  Dechow et al. (1996) suggest that large block-holders of shares improve 
the credibility of a firm’s financial statements by providing scrutiny over its earnings management activity. 
Bathala, Moon, and Rao found that use of managerial stock ownership is inversely related to institutional 
ownership in the firm.   The institutional ownership negatively affects managerial ownership as a form of 
shareholders intervention on the performance of managers. Increased institutional ownership means improving 
the supervision and control of the opportunistic behaviour of executives. High institutional ownership leads to 
decreased managerial ownership (Kartika, 2010).  These conditions will reduce its earnings management 
practices. Therefore it can be concluded that managerial ownership moderates the influence of institutional 
ownership on earnings management.  
 
H1:    Managerial ownership has a significant negative influence on earnings management. 
H2:    Institutional ownership has a significant negative impact on earnings management 
H3:  Institutional ownership moderates the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings 
management. 
 
2.3 Managerial Ownership, Firm Size, and Earnings Management. 
 
In general, managerial ownership occurs in small firms than large firms (Imanta, 2011). Previous researchers’ 
results show that firm size has a negative influence on managerial ownership (Mahadwartha, 2003; Vidyantie, 
2006). Additionally, Wahidahwati (2002) argues that the bigger the company, the less managerial ownership. 
The circumstances happen when there exists a provision that limits the ability for the manager to acquire 
company’s shares.  According to Ali et al. (2010) firm size may be one of the important reasons that affect the 
managerial ownership and agency conflict relationship. This result suggests that managerial ownership should 
be encouraged in small firms so that it can represent a substitute for the weakness of other corporate governance 
mechanisms. Their study also indicates that other types of ownership play a major role in monitoring firms’ 
activities (Kazemian and Zuraidah, 2015, p 621).   
 
Larger companies would have less incentive to manage earnings because they face greater political costs and are 
more subject to scrutiny from financial analysts and investors (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990).  Furthermore, 
Mansor et al. (2013) discover that smaller sized companies have the tendency to be involved in income 
smoothing activities as their actions would not be scrutinized.  The current study measures firm size as the 
natural log of total assets.  Kazemian and Zuraidah (2015) also investigate the moderating effect of firm size on 
the relationship between managerial ownership on earnings management. They argue that although management 
ownership may reduce the earnings management activities, other factors such as firm size may also affect the 
behavioural pattern. Managerial ownership is more prominent and hence, an efficient monitoring mechanism, 
particularly in small firms. Their findings show that the size of the firm is a ‘quasi’ moderating variable where 
the negative and significant relationship between the level of management ownership and discretionary accruals 
weakened by a positive and significant relationship between the interaction between the size of the firm and 
executive ownership and discretionary accruals.  Based on this foundation, a conclusion can be reached that firm 
size moderates the influence of managerial ownership and earnings management. 
  
According to Kazemian and Zuraidah (2015), although an increase in managerial ownership will reduce 
earnings management practices, their study shows that managerial ownership is less significant in large-sized 
companies compared with small-sized enterprises. Large-sized companies differ regarding the adoption of 
corporate governance mechanisms than medium-sized organizations.  This is because the agency conflict is 
higher in large-sized organizations. Therefore, managerial ownership is becoming less a role in controlling. 
 
H4: Firm size has a significant negative influence on earnings management  
H5: Firm size moderates the relationship between managerial ownership on earnings management. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Population and sample 
 
The population of the study encompasses the manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange 
from 2008 to 2012. A total of 136 companies serves as a sample. After screening based on criteria depicted in 
Table 3, the final sample size was 115 companies. The detailed sample of description is illustrated in Table 1 of 
the study. 
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Table 1: Sample Description 
Manufacture companies listed 2008-2012 136 
Incomplete data (21) 
Qualified sample 115 
No. of years 5 
Total year-observations 575 
 
3.2 Measurement of Earnings Management 
 
Earnings management is measured by using a discretionary accrual (DACC). The findings of the study Tsai and 
Chiou (2009) found that the cross-sectional Jones model (Jones, 1991) is the most popular model in the 
literature for detecting earnings management.The following model is cross-sectional Jones model to estimate for 
non-discretionary accrual (Ratnawati & Ali, 2014). 
 
The Jones model: 
NDAijt = α0it (1/TAijt-1) +α1it (Δ REVijt/TAijt-1)+α2it(PPEijt/TAijt-1).. ………(1) 
In which: 
Δ REVt = earnings changes for  periodt and t-1 
PPEt=the fixed assetsof firm in year tdivided bytotalassets offirm i atthe end ofyear t-1 
TAt_1 = total asset at the end of the year t-1 period 
i = industry  
J = the sample of companies 
α0, α1 and α2 = company-specific parameters, obtained from the following models: 
TACCijt = α0it (1 / TAijt-1) + α1it (Δ REVijt / TAijt-1) + α2it ((PPE ijt / TAijt-1) + εijt .. (2)  
DACC = TACCit - NDACCit 
TACC = total accrual 
NDACC = nondiscreationary accrual 
 
3.3 Measure of independents variables  
 
Managerial ownership  =  % managerial ownership in the company (Morck,  
               Shleifer & Vishny, 1988; Ratnawati & Ali, 2015). 
 
Institutional ownership  =    % institutional ownership in the company (Siregar & 
              Utama, 2008; Ratnawati & Ali, 2015) 
 
Firm Size =    is defined as the nature log (ln) of total assets (Hasan & Ahmed, 2012; 
   Mansor, Ahmad Zaluki, & Osman, 2013) 
 
3.4 Techniques of data Analysis 
 
The test of hypotheses was done using multiple regression models as stated below:  
DACC = α + β1Mgr +β2 Inst +β3CR + β4CFR + β5CFRLev + ε 
Where:  
DACC =  Discretionary Accrual 
Mgr  =  Managerial Ownership 
Inst  =  Institutional Ownership 
Firm Size =  Log Total Asset 
 
3.5 Data Normality and Classical Assumption Test 
 
3.5.1 Normality Testing  
 
The normal distribution of data obtained for the study was detected using normal probability plot analysis. 
Normality test results in this study showed that the points spread around the diagonal line, and the distribution 
follows the direction of the diagonal line. This indicates that the data meet the normality assumption.  
 
3.5.2 Multicollinearity Testing 
 
To determine whether there is autocorrelation, the result of the test conducted to shows Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) value of each independent variable as depicted in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Multicollinearity Evaluation of the Study 
Collinearity Statistics   
Model Tolerance VIF T Value P Value 
MgrOwn 1.000 1.000 -6.385 0.000 
MgrOwnInstOwn 0.437 2.290 2.136 0.033 
MgrOwnFirmSize 0.229 4.375 -2.170 0.030 
Dependent variable: DACC (Y) 
 
The Table 2 shows that all the independent variables have a tolerance value > 0.10 and VIF < 10. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the independent variables used in the regression model of this research are free from the 
problem of multicollinearity (Gozali, 2013).   
 
3.5.3 Autocorrelation Testing 
 
To determine whether there is autocorrelation can be seen from the DW value was calculated for each variable, 
as shown in Table 3.  The Durbin-Watson value of 1.761 and the value range between the values DW -2 to +2, 
which means there is no autocorrelation (Gozali, 2013). Thus, there is no problem of autocorrelation in the 
regression model of this study. 
 
Table 3: Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Chang
e 
df1 df2 
Sig F 
Change 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 0.266a 0.071 0.068 0.12639601 0.071 21.848 2 572 0.000 1.761 
a Predictors (Constant), MgrOwn, FirmSize, MgrOwnInstOwn 
b Dependent Variable Y 
 
3.5.4 Heteroscedasticity Testing  
 
The results showed that the points on the image does not form a specific pattern and the data spread above and 
below the number 0 on the Y axis, where this indicates that the model did not experience heteroscedasticity, 
which means that the sample variance of the observation residuals to other observations have in common and 
can be said to be efficient. Thus, based on the assumptions of a standard test result as illustrated in Figure 2, the 
model is free of autocorrelation, multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity.  It can, therefore, be concluded that 
this model is fit for use in this study. 
 
 
Figure 2: Scatterplot of the Heteroscedasticity Assessment of the Study 
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4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION  
 
4.1 Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, and Earnings Management.  
 
From Table 2, the results revealed that MgrOwn t-value and the p-value of -6.385 and 0.000 respectively. 
Therefore, managerial ownership has a negative influence on earnings management.  Based on that findings, it 
can be concluded that the higher managerial ownership, will decrease the possibility of earnings management 
practices.   
 
Regression result also showed that t-value and p-value of MgrInstOwn each 2.136 and 0.033 and has a positive 
sign.  Its indicates that institutional ownership strengthens the influence betweenI managerial ownership and 
earnings management.  Based on that finding, it can be concluded that with the occurrence of institutional 
ownership, the influence of managerial ownership on earnings management getting stronger. The higher the 
managerial ownership will decrease the possibility of earnings management practices, and with the presence of 
institutional ownership, then the possibility of earnings management practices will decrease from the previous.  
This finding collaborates prior literature (Bushee, 1998; Chung, Firth, and Kim, 2002; Cornett et al., 2008; 
Ebrahim, 2007; Koh, 2003) that argued that institutional ownership inhibits managers to engage 
opportunistically in earnings management.  
 
4.2 Managerial Ownership, Firm Size, and Earnings Management.  
 
From Table 2, the t-value and p-value for MgrOwnFirmSize, each -2.170 and 0.030 respectively.  Based on that 
value, it can be argued that firm size weakens the negative influence between managerial ownership on earnings 
management. Furthermore, as a result of the significant value and positive sign of the interaction between 
managerial ownership and firm size, it can be concluded that firm size moderates the influence of managerial 
ownership on earnings management. The positive sign of beta indicated that interaction between managerial 
ownership and firm size weakened the influence of managerial ownership and earnings management.  
 
The current study results are in agreement with Kazemian and Zuraidah (2015) study, which found that the firm 
size as a ‘quasi’ moderator, and had the negative and significant relationship between the level of management 
ownership and discretionary accruals, and is weakened by a positive and significant relationship between the 
interaction between firm size and discretionary accruals. These scholars argued that although management 
ownership may reduce the earnings management activities, other factors such as firm size may also affect the 
behaviour.  Therefore managerial ownership is found to be an effective monitoring mechanism, particularly in 
small firms. Their suggests that managerial ownership should be encouraged in small firms so that it can be the 
substitute for the weakness of other corporate governance mechanisms.  Their study also argued that other types 
of ownership play a major role in monitoring firms’ activities.  Therefore it can be concluded that managerial 
ownership is less significant in large-sized firms compared to small-sized firms (Kazemian and Zuraidah, 2015, 
p 621). 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The objective of this study is to provide some empirical evidence of the interaction effect of institutional 
ownership and firm size on the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management.  In this 
study, it was proposed that managerial ownership has adverse effects on earnings management, and institutional 
ownership and firm size influence the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management. 
While this study found that managerial ownership affects earnings management, institutional ownership 
strengthens the influence of managerial ownership on earnings management.  This finding also suggests that 
interaction of managerial ownership and firm size weakened the influence of managerial ownership on earnings 
management.  
 
The results of this study have the potentials to assist institutions such as the Indonesia Stock Exchange and 
investors to know how the ownership structure and size of the firm can influence the existence of earnings 
management practices.   Besides, from the theoretical aspect, these findings provide a better understanding of 
the agency theory more broadly vis-a-vis the relative impacts of agency theory on the existence of earnings 
management practices. 
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